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No Justioe, No Zn4ustrial Peace 1

Gilmer:

By J. Clay smith, Jr.
Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law

The

question

for

civil

rights

claims

after

Gilmer

v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 111 S. ct. 1647 (1991) is:
whether an employer of fifteen or more people, may, prior to or
contempo~aneous

with employing a person or groups of persons,

present and exact an agreement to arbitrate all claims, including
federally created civil rights or constitutional claims, involving
race, color, sex, creed, religion, or national origin, on any terms
or conditions of employment?
no.

The best answer to this question is

The reason for this answer is that arbitration agreements

should

not

render

the

expressed

national

purposes

against

employment discrimination and, perhaps, other forms of unlawful
activity (protected under the post-Reconstruction statutes) as nonreviewable.

1 Before the Howard University Symposium on Current Issues in
Arbitration, Friday, October 8, 1993, sponsored by the Howard
University School of Law, School of Business, the American
Arbitration Association, the Baywood Publishing Co., Inc., and the
National Bar Association. My thanks to Brigette L. stevens, an L3
student at Howard University School of Law, for her assistance in
this matter.
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Before there was a Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer was
free to discriminate against persons on the basis of race sex,
creed, national origin and religion with almost immunity.

Some

states may have adopted fair employment practice laws to protect
workers against discriminatory acts of their employers.

However,

these laws were not very effective in their enforcement and not
very strong in the award of remedies.
The

civil

comprehensive

Rights

Act

employment

of" 1964

was

the

anti-discrimination

nation's
law,

amended, has always faced opposition by some, who

first

which,

as

believed that

the resolution of disputes between employer and employee should be
left for resolution between the two.

Because discrimination

remains a dominant force in the work place, jurisdictional claims
of discrimination under Title 7 of the civil Rights Act of 1964
have continued to spiral.
discrimination,

Rather than to treat the root causes of

some members of the commercial,

and political

community, have sought to accommodate and advocate for alternative
means to deal with discrimination outside the courts, where, I
believe, they predict that employers can save money (attorney's
fees, filing costs, etc.,) in the defense against such claims, and,
perhaps, indirectly influence the outcome by the pre/post hiring
terms set forth in the arbitration agreements.
Let's examine two hypothetical cases and see how they play in
a post-Gilmer climate:
First Case. A, a black woman applies to B, an employer of 100
people to work in a widget

factory~
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The factory is located in a

small county in Mississippi, where blacks are underemployed and
historically have been unemployed, and politically unrepresented,
or marginally so. A is a member of the NAACP, the Mt. Nebo Baptist
Church, whose minster is a leading civil rights advocate.

For

Black people in the community, jobs are scarce, and black people
are underemployed,

not only in the city of B' s manufacturing

Company, but in the County as well.

Assume further that A has

three children, is a single parent, rents an apartment, or lives in
substandard housing and is not well educated.

When A applies for

the job, B informs A that she has the job, but that B wants A to
sign an agreement that A will arbitrate all claims arising out of
her employment.

What do you think that A is going to do?

Let's

assume the unlikely: that A refuses to signs the agreement, and B
finds some pretext not to hire A, but never says that the real
reason that she is not being hired is because A won't sign the
arbitration agreement?

Does anyone

believe that

the

next

applicant from Mt. Nebo Church, whose circumstances is similar to
A's is going to decline to sign the arbitration agreement? One can
assume that when A is presented with the arbitration agreement
which can be defined as an offer to enter into a legally binding
contract, A will not have an opportunity to or may not be able to
afford to consult with a lawyer.

My guess is that if A asks to

take the agreement to a lawyer, that B will not hire A.

What

rights does A have against B?

A is

a

poor black woman,

What difference does it make?

in a community where her value can be

sUbstituted by someone else.

B, the employer, already the dominant
3

person as relates to A, is now further empowered by the Gilmer
opinion to use liB's right" of conditioning employment on signing
the arbitration agreement to discriminate without recourse to
courts of law.
Second Case.

Assume that A,

a white female high school

graduate, works for B, who owns several clothing stores in New York
city.

B has been known to harass women.

Indeed,

employee

complaints have been filed, one ,successfully, against him before
the EEOC.

Assume that A is being harassed by B, A will not give in

and B continues to persist. Assume that A threatens to file a
complaint against B at EEOC, and in fact does.

During the sixty

days that EEOC has to determine cause, B presents an arbitration
agreement signed by A that A routinely, but without full knowledge
of the consequences, signed while being processed through B' s
personnel office when she was hired four years ago.
do with this agreement?
investigation

unearths

What does EEOC

Assume that A's complaint and EEOC's
several

other

victims

of

B's

sexual

harassment, who, unlike A, do not have the courage to file a claim
for fear of losing their jobs.

How does Gilmer potentially apply

under these circumstances? Is EEOC precluded from taking a role in
the claim brought by A? What if EEOC chooses not to exercise its
enforcement powers?

Independent of EEOC,

will the federal courts

grant B's motion to dismiss A's claim when the
agreement is presented?

arbitration

will the court hear testimony from A that

she was unaware that she had signed a preclusion agreement?
is the burden of proof to demonstrate
4

What

lack of knowledge or

appreciation

of

the

consequences

of

signing

the

agreement

(particularly of the waiver of constitutional violations or the
waiver of constitutional rights, e.g., the right to a jury trial).
will a lawyer even take A's case?
A.

Before attempting to answer the questions posed by these

two questions let me say that I am not optimistic about the postGilmer era as it relates to the rights of employees.
to the point.

As

rel~tes

to employees

So let me get

not members of unions,

(and, maybe to "individuals," who are members of unions), the
execution of arbitration agreements will substantially affect their
rights available under federal and state law.

For example,

employees will be waiving the right to a jury trial by signing an
arbitration agreement, and other sUbstantive and procedural rights
available in federal and state courts, such as procedural rights
available under the Federal Rules of civil Procedure.

The question

is whether employees have reached a point in American labor law
where Congress or state legislatures must devise a non-waiver
statement to be provided by a company or employer for hire which
states something like this:
"Durinq the course of employment, I (do) / (not) waive any right
to redress any claim or controversy arising out of my employment in
a court of law."
Further, minimally, it seems to me that employers by law
should be required to advise employees or prospective employees
that they are not required to sign an arbitration agreement, and
that if they do not sign one they will not incur any penalty for
5

not doing so.

If Congress or state legislatures do not enact such

protection, I foresee, and encourage the rise of a new industry of
independent employment counselors to help citizens negotiate jobs
in non-unionized work places, and more watchdog groups to assure
that collective bargaining agreements do not unfairly undermine
federally

created

rights

of

employees

to

have

their

claims

determined by the courts.
B. Legal arguments that may ,counter an extension of Gilmer to
civil rights type claims are as follows:
1.

Congress could not have intended to include the subject

matter of civil right-type claims under the FAA in 1925 because
neither the common law or federal law had experience or practice in
arbitral disputes with the category of claims arising under Tit. 7.
2.

Congress by its enactment of the FAA/1925 could not have

legislated in futuro to preclude federal jurisdiction over the
subject

matter of federal or local civil rights claims given the

history of race in the country in 1925.

The resolution of race,

sex, color, national origin and religious claims arising out of
employment were not contemplated by Congress in 1925.

And, for

point of argument, assuming that Gilmer stands, and that the FAA
applies to ADEA claims, it is submitted that such claims do not
have the same history as race, sex, color, national origin, or
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religious discriminatory claims

in this country to

foreclose

federal courts from hearing the merits of such claims. Gilmer, at
1652.
3.

Does an individual arbitral contract of employment which

precludes an action under judicial authority actually constitute a
transaction affecting commerce?

Isn't the discriminatory acts of

the employer that affects commerce, and doesn't the judicial forum
made available by Congress under the Ti t.

7 offer,

by public

policy, an overriding, indeed, superior command to have such claims
resolved in a judicial forum?
4.

Gilmer, at 1651, n 2.

If the FAA is intended to liberally favor arbitral

agreements (Gilmer, at 1651), its reach appears to be limited to
contracts solely of a commercial nature. Hence, Gilmer may be
appropriately distinguished by the nature of the unique regulatory
scheme of the security Exchange Commission (and the anti-trust
laws, etc.) under which the Gilmer case arose (which is quite
different from that of workers in an unregulated commercial widget
factory). Gilmer, at 1652.
5.

The Court in Gilmer states that "Although all statutory

claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, '[h]avinq made a
bargain to arbitrate, the parties should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies ••• '" Gilmer, at 1652.
is:

Is the "bargain" a fair one?

condition

for

arbitration

it

is not

I submit that the question

There can be no bargain if the

legitimate.

The very

act

of

the

may be an one to limit the reach of federal law on a
7

class basis. Gilmer, at 1652.
6.

The burden of proof assigned in Gilmer would not, in my

view, be the same if the subject matter of the claim was race,
color, sex, creed, national origin or religion.

The deep rooted

history of these categories, and there impact on the marketplace as
demonstrated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, logically places the
burden of proof on the employer to demonstrated that Congress's
intent was to preclude judicial authority to hear Tit. 7 claims as
a matter of overriding public policy. Gilmer, at 1652.
7.

In Gilmer, themes of efficiency, not justice, dominate,

and judicially permit, if not encourage, adhesive contracts as
relates to employment.

Even though Gilmer states that "courts

should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement
to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of
any contract'" (Gilmer, at 1656), well-supported claims cannot
logically or reasonably be expected to be established from the
working poor of America, as against the employers that have the
power to deny employment to minorities

that

continue to

be

historically in poverty. See e.g., Paulette Thomas, Poverty Spread
in 1922 to Total of 36.9 Million, Wall st. J., oct 5, 1993, at A2.
8.
states:

As relate to the regulatory powers of the EEOC, Gilmer
"Finally,

it should be remembered that arbitration

agreements will not preclude the EEOC from b.ringing actions seeking
classwide and equitable relief." Gilmer, at 1655.

This statement

misreads (or perhaps, properly reads) the history of the EEOC and
8

t~e

executive branch of government for the past decade, which so

underfunded EEOC and other civil rights agencies, so as possibly to
make the Court's statement in Gilmer meaningless.

See e.g., Civil

Rights Commission to Look at Agencies, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 18, 1993,
at 5. The resources at EEOC and the unwillingness of

presidents

and Congress to provide adequate funding to enforce civil rights
claims and policy, or refusal of jurisdictional agencies to enforce
the law,

make the above quote hollow, a statement devoid of

justice.

Arbitration agreements in the labor and civil rights

areas may encourage federal agencies not to enforce the laws,
leaving the same for private resolution and out of the reach of the
courts.
I predict that when the American people, the poor and the
middle class discover that even the EEOC is without economic power
to eradicate discrimination or unable to gain corrective relief in
the courts because of underfunding, we will see the most dramatic
demonstrations ever witnessed in this country.
politicians

(not

institutional

bodies

that

have

I submit that
an

economic

interest in arbitration) are going to have to persuade the public
that arbitration is preferable to Article III adjudication of civil
rights claims.
politicians.

This is going to pose a serious problem for

(The implications of arbitration under state's civil

rights laws also will be impacted, particularly for million of
employees not covered by tit. 7, i.e., employees with fewer than 15
employees.).
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Given the discourse of this presentation, I leave it to you as
to whether the problems posed in Case One, and Two above would be
resolved 'in favor of A.
nagging

questions

to

However, I leave you with two of many
ponder:

could

Gilmer

apply

to

a

constitutional protection that is violated by a government employer
during the

c~urse

of an employment covered by an arbitration

agreement, or apply to a federal statutory prohibition or civil
right of a citizen which is violated by a private employer covered
by an arbitration agreement?
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